Inside the October FOMC Minutes: How Close Is the Fed to Another Hike in December?

Market data read November 18, 2026, 2:28 p.m. CT (FedWatch page time “18 Nov 2026 02:16:33 CT,” before the minutes’ release). The FOMC minutes were released at 1:00 p.m. CT on November 18. All times are Central Time (CT). Labels in this article: Fact = stated in an official source; Analysis = EconShift’s reading of those facts; Speculation = possible but not supported by enough evidence; Scenario = a conditional outline, not a forecast.

The short version

The minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) October 27–28 meeting, published November 18, show a Committee that held rates in October but did not change its view of where policy is heading (FOMC minutes). “Most participants” supported holding the target range at 3.75%–4.00%, while “some participants” favored a 25 basis-point increase at that meeting. Looking ahead, “almost all participants” judged that further action to raise the target range “would likely be appropriate.”

Analysis. On the record of the minutes, the disagreement inside the Committee was about timing and size, not direction. That is a reading of the October discussion. The minutes contain no sentence saying the Fed will raise rates in December, and this article does not make that call.

1. What the minutes say about further hikes — in their own words

Fact. The minutes use different quantifiers for different groups of participants. The table below quotes them verbatim (FOMC minutes).

Who (exact wording) What they said (verbatim excerpt)
most participants “expressed support for maintaining the target range for the federal funds rate”
Many of these participants “pointed to benefits in accumulating additional information”
Some participants “favored an increase of 25 basis points in the target range at this meeting”
a few of them (of those favoring an increase) “warned that further delay risked allowing high inflation to become entrenched or necessitating a larger and more disruptive tightening later”
A few participants who favored an increase “could have supported no change in the federal funds rate provided that it was clearly understood by market participants that further tightening was likely”
A few participants (supporting the hold) “viewed the decision as a close call”
Some participants observed that “market-implied expectations of tightening steps in December and next year were broadly consistent with their assessments of the appropriate policy rate path” — and several “saw this alignment as reducing the risks associated with keeping the target range unchanged at this meeting”
almost all participants judged that “further action to raise the target range for the federal funds rate—broadly consistent with the September Summary of Economic Projections—would likely be appropriate”
A couple of participants “noted that an increase of more than 25 basis points could warrant consideration at the next meeting if incoming inflation data were unfavorable”
A few participants “observed that inflation could prove more persistent than anticipated, in which case a shift to a more restrictive policy stance could become necessary”
A couple of participants “noted that, at the current juncture, a gradual approach to policy firming would give businesses and households time to adjust to higher interest rates”

Fact. The minutes also record that “Many participants stressed the importance of clearly relaying the message that the decision to maintain the target range did not reflect a weakening of the Committee’s commitment to returning inflation to 2 percent in a timely manner,” and that “future policy decisions would depend on the incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks.”

Two cautions on reading this table.

  • “Some” and “almost all” are different groups. “Some participants” wanted to hike in October. “Almost all participants” judged that further increases would likely be appropriate in the months ahead. Combining the two into “almost everyone wanted to hike” would misstate the minutes.
  • The words are not headcounts. The Federal Reserve does not say how many people stand behind “some,” “several,” “a few” or “a couple,” and the minutes give no numbers. A common reading treats “most” as stronger than “many,” and “some” or “several” as stronger than “a few” or “a couple,” but that ordering is a reading convention, not an official definition. EconShift does not convert these words into counts.

Fact. No sentence in the minutes says the Committee will raise rates in December. The closest statements are the “almost all participants” sentence and the “couple of participants” sentence about “the next meeting,” both quoted above.

2. The 10–2 hold and the two dissents

Fact. On October 28 the Committee held the federal funds target range at 3-3/4 to 4 percent by a 10–2 vote. Voting against were Governor Lisa D. Cook and Cleveland Fed President Beth M. Hammack, “who preferred to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage point at this meeting” (FOMC statement). The hold followed the September rate increase (September 16 statement); the minutes refer to the need to assess “the transmission of the September rate increase to the economy.”

Fact — why the majority waited. Participants favoring the hold “cited the need to assess the durability of AI-related investment demand, the evolution of financing conditions, the transmission of the September rate increase to the economy, or geopolitical developments” (FOMC minutes). The October statement put it this way: “The accumulation of more information will help the Committee determine the policy stance appropriate to ensure a timely return of inflation to the Committee’s 2 percent goal. The Committee will deliver price stability” (FOMC statement).

Fact — the case made for hiking in October. The minutes describe, without naming anyone, the reasoning of participants who favored an immediate increase: they emphasized “that inflation had remained too high and that they saw few signs of it abating,” and “judged that the current policy stance was not sufficiently restrictive.” A few of them warned about entrenched inflation or a “larger and more disruptive tightening later.” Separately, “A few participants observed that only a limited amount of additional data would become available in coming weeks, geopolitical uncertainty was unlikely to be substantially resolved in the near future, or the next inflation release was likely to be unfavorable.”

What cannot be confirmed. Neither Governor Cook nor President Hammack has published a separate statement explaining her October dissent; EconShift’s search of the Federal Reserve’s news and speech listings found none. The reasons above are the minutes’ collective description of “some participants,” not attributed to either dissenter. Because non-voting Reserve Bank presidents also count as “participants,” the “some” who favored a hike may include people other than the two voters (Speculation — the minutes do not say). This article therefore does not state either dissenter’s personal reasons.

Fact — the Chairman’s stance on December. At the October 28 press conference, Chairman Kevin Warsh did not commit to a December move. “I also don’t believe in prejudging meetings,” he said. In a separate answer he said: “We will deliver price stability—no ifs, ands, or buts” (press conference transcript).

Fact — one governor since the meeting. In a November 18 speech, Governor Michael S. Barr said: “If the economy evolves as I currently forecast, I expect it will be appropriate to raise rates further to achieve that goal on behalf of the American people,” adding that he would “continue to monitor the incoming data, the evolving forecast, and the balance of risks” (Barr). That is one policymaker’s view, and it does not specify a meeting.

3. How October CPI fits — and the data still to come

Fact. October CPI, released November 10, showed headline prices up 0.4% and core prices up 0.3% month over month, the third straight 0.3% core reading; energy rose 0.7% after 5.2% in September (BLS; see our analysis, October CPI, Read by Its Parts). No official 12-month change was published for headline or core CPI because October 2025 data were not collected.

Fact — how the minutes describe inflation. Participants “acknowledged that inflation remained elevated”; “most remarked that inflation pressures in the economy were broad based”; “The vast majority noted that high energy prices continued to contribute to current inflation pressures”; and “Many participants observed that demand for products associated with the AI buildout was continuing to strain supply and raise prices of technology-related consumer goods.” The staff attributed higher inflation “largely to the effects of earlier tariff increases, higher energy price inflation, and upward pressure on consumer goods prices that was associated with the AI buildout.” Most participants expected inflation “to remain elevated in the near term but to decline over time toward 2 percent,” and the vast majority “saw upside risks to this outlook,” citing higher energy prices and refined-fuel supply constraints (FOMC minutes).

Analysis — what October CPI does and doesn’t settle. The October meeting took place before the CPI release, and a few participants had cited, among other reasons, that “the next inflation release was likely to be unfavorable.” A 0.3% core reading did not cool, but it was also no hotter than August or September. Set against the minutes, it reads closer to a continuation of the path the Committee described than to the “unfavorable” inflation data that “a couple of participants” linked to a larger move. The minutes do not define “unfavorable,” so this cannot be settled from the text.

Analysis — why October PCE may matter more than usual. The minutes flag “an unusual discrepancy between CPI and PCE inflation rates.” The PCE price index, the Fed’s target measure, rose 3.6% over the 12 months to September, with core PCE at 3.1% (BEA). With the two measures diverging, the October PCE report may carry more weight with the Committee than in a typical month.

Calendar before the December 8–9 meeting (all times CT):

Date Event Source
Nov 19–20 Scheduled remarks by Vice Chair Jefferson and Governor Barr (Nov 19); Governor Cook, “The U.S. Economy in Global Context,” 11:15 a.m. CT, and Governor Waller (Nov 20) Federal Reserve calendar
Nov 25, 7:30 a.m. BEA, Personal Income and Outlays, October 2026 (October PCE); September figures may be revised BEA
Nov 27, 11:00 p.m. Pre-meeting blackout period begins (through 10:59 p.m. Dec 10); dates derived from the FOMC’s published rule, not listed on an official page FOMC communications policy
Dec 4, 7:30 a.m. BLS Employment Situation, November 2026 BLS schedule
Dec 9 FOMC decision; Chair’s press conference 1:30 p.m. FOMC minutes; Federal Reserve calendar
Dec 10 November CPI — after the decision BLS schedule

Among remarks listed on the Federal Reserve Board’s calendar for November 18–20, Governor Cook’s is the only appearance by either October dissenter; whether President Hammack has remarks scheduled before the blackout could not be confirmed. Whether Governor Cook addresses her October vote is unknown until the text is published.

4. Policy context: the economy the Committee is describing

Fact. The October statement said “Productivity growth is strong, and capital investment is robust.” Participants “generally assessed that economic activity continued to expand at a strong pace, supported by resilient household spending and robust business fixed investment,” and “characterized labor market conditions as stable and close to maximum employment,” citing low layoffs and initial claims (FOMC minutes). The staff expected total inflation “to step down sharply next year as energy prices decelerated,” with the boost from tariff increases, geopolitical turmoil and the AI buildout “expected to mostly fade over the next couple of years.”

Fact — the other side of the ledger. The same minutes say “A few noted that higher prices of necessities were straining the budgets of lower- and middle-income households,” and “some noted that labor market dynamism remained unusually low,” including “elevated long-term unemployment.”

Analysis — policy impact. This mix shapes the December debate in two ways. First, the Committee describes the real economy — growth, investment, productivity and a labor market near maximum employment — as strong, so the case for further tightening in the minutes rests on inflation rather than on weakness elsewhere. Second, the staff’s view that tariff, energy and AI-related price pressures will “mostly fade” over a couple of years is a staff forecast, not an outcome. How quickly any fading appears in the PCE data is one of the questions the November 25 report bears on.

5. December scenarios: what would have to happen

The outlines below are conditional scenarios, not forecasts. EconShift assigns no probability to them. They describe the data patterns that, on the reading of the minutes, would be consistent with each outcome.

Scenario Trigger conditions What in the minutes supports it
+25 bp (to 4.00%–4.25%) October PCE broadly consistent with October CPI; November jobs solid but not overheating; the Committee follows the path it has communicated “almost all participants” saw further increases as likely appropriate; the Desk survey median expected “one rate hike in December”
+50 bp (to 4.25%–4.50%) October core PCE comes in high, with broader price pressures; strong November jobs; more policymakers publicly question whether 25 bp is enough “A couple of participants” said more than 25 bp “could warrant consideration at the next meeting if incoming inflation data were unfavorable” — explicitly conditional
No change (3.75%–4.00%) October PCE eases clearly; November jobs weaken, or financial markets come under significant stress “A couple of participants” favored “a gradual approach to policy firming”; “Many” of those supporting the October hold pointed to the benefits of accumulating information; almost all participants commented on financial-stability risks in a scenario where returns on AI investment disappoint

Analysis. The minutes’ “further action … would likely be appropriate” language spans almost all participants, while the conditions that separate these scenarios depend mainly on data not yet released: the November 25 PCE report and the December 4 jobs report. This describes the text of the minutes, not the likelihood of any outcome in December.

6. What futures markets are pricing

Market data, not a Fed decision. On the CME FedWatch tool, read at 2:28 p.m. CT on November 18, the probabilities for the December 9 meeting were: 4.00%–4.25% (a 25 bp increase) 92.7%; 4.25%–4.50% (a 50 bp increase) 7.3%; unchanged at 3.75%–4.00% 0.0% (CME FedWatch). The page labelled this reading “18 Nov 2026 02:16:33 CT.” On a 24-hour clock, that time is earlier than the 1:00 p.m. CT release of the minutes, so these figures should not be read as the market’s reaction to the minutes. One week earlier (November 11), the same page showed 87.3% and 12.7% for the two hike outcomes.

These are futures-implied probabilities derived from 30-day fed funds futures, provided for market-pricing reference only. They are not EconShift forecasts and are not investment advice.

Fact. The minutes themselves noted that, ahead of the October meeting, futures pricing showed “little chance of a rate increase associated with this meeting but high probabilities assigned to a 25 basis point hike by year-end and two more by the summer of 2027,” and that “Some participants” saw market expectations as “broadly consistent with their assessments” (FOMC minutes).

What remains uncertain

  • Headcounts. The number of participants behind “some,” “several,” “a few” and “a couple” is not published and cannot be confirmed.
  • The dissenters’ reasons. Governor Cook’s and President Hammack’s individual reasons for their October dissents cannot be confirmed from official sources as of this writing.
  • Post-minutes pricing. The FedWatch figures cited carry a page time earlier than the minutes’ release; a market reading taken after the minutes is not used here.
  • Revisions. September PCE figures may be revised on November 25.

This article is for general information and educational purposes only and is not investment advice. See our Methodology, Sources & Disclaimer.

Sources

  1. Federal Reserve Board, Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, October 27–28, 2026 (released November 18, 2026): https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20261028.htm
  2. Federal Reserve Board, press release on the minutes, November 18, 2026: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261118a.htm
  3. Federal Reserve Board, FOMC statement, October 28, 2026: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20261028a.htm
  4. Federal Reserve Board, FOMC statement, September 16, 2026: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm
  5. Federal Reserve Board, transcript of the Chair’s press conference, October 28, 2026: https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20261028.pdf
  6. Governor Michael S. Barr, “Investing in America’s Underserved Communities,” November 18, 2026: https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/barr20261118a.htm
  7. Federal Reserve Board, calendar data: https://www.federalreserve.gov/json/calendar.json
  8. FOMC Policy on External Communications of Committee Participants: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC_ExtCommunicationParticipants.pdf
  9. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Personal Income and Outlays, September 2026,” October 29, 2026: https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/personal-income-and-outlays-september-2026
  10. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Consumer Price Index – October 2026” (USDL-26-1685): https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.nr0.htm
  11. BLS, Employment Situation release schedule: https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/empsit.htm
  12. BLS, CPI release schedule: https://www.bls.gov/schedule/news_release/cpi.htm
  13. CME Group, CME FedWatch tool (read November 18, 2026, 2:28 p.m. CT; page time “18 Nov 2026 02:16:33 CT”): https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/interest-rates/cme-fedwatch-tool
  14. EconShift, “October CPI, Read by Its Parts”: https://econshiftfinance.com/october-2026-cpi-analysis/
  15. Official biographies: Lisa D. Cook https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/cook.htm ; Beth M. Hammack https://www.clevelandfed.org/president-and-ceo ; Kevin Warsh https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/warsh.htm

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